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systems of labor law could hardly be more dijfere/lf: regula1io11 of the unions in the 
early period of industrialism became minimal in Sweden and massive in America, 
where the courts were sh-oi1gly anthmion. In b01h countries the way 1111io11s were 
treated by the public authorities had far-reaching effects not 011/y on labor rela-
tions bllf al.w on political s1rucrure and 011 public policies. In Sweden, a 11ear-
absence of labor legislation and key decisions in the Supreme Court facilitated a 
rapid growth of the unions and, indirec1/y, of the Social De111ocra1ic Labor Par1y, 
which became dominant in Swedish politics . In America, legal restmints were par-
ticularly ejfeuive against attempts to organize unskilled workers. Labor organiza-
tions became smaller, more middle-class oriented and less injlue111ial than they 
had a potential to become. Low levels of union membership effected workers' par-
ticipation in politics and elections and influenced America in a conservative direc-
tion. There is not much evidence that American workers, to begin with, were less 
inclined to organize 1han workers in Europe. 
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In June 1938 , President Franklin D. Roosevelt requested an impartial 
account of the labor-employer relations in Sweden. An official commis-
sion representing both sides in industry visited Sweden. The Swedish 
Employers ' Confederation (SAF) and the Swedish Trade Union Con-
federation (LO) supplied a joint account of industrial relations, and the 
commission met several spokesmen from both sides, who were said to be 
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"outspoken in their respect for each other." Leading representatives of 
the SAF and the LO received the commission at a joint meeting . Both 
employers and workers prefctTed voluntary negotiations to any kind of 
government compulsion. The closed shop " [is] not a significant issue in 
Sweden , because of the very large proportion of workers who are union 
members and because the employers no longer try to break down union 
organization, preferring to deal with their workers through strong trade 
unions." On the other hand , the employers were not asked by the unions 
to exercise pressure upon their employees to make them join the unions. 
The commission reported that discrimination against workers due to 
union activity was not a significant problem. The settlement of differ-
ences by methods of persuasion rather than by force had become the 
order of the day. Problems that caused endless quarrels in America were 
not even significant issues in Sweden. The commission emphasized the 
absence of legislation restricting concerted action of trade unions and 
employers and the fact that union activity was substantially free from 
regulations so long as it did not "violate the ordinary police regulations 
that apply to all citizens." 1 
Politically, Sweden is markedly different from America. The Social 
Democratic Labor Party has been dominant since the 1930s, social 
equality is considered a paramount value, the public sector is large, and 
taxes are high. In America the prevailing philosophy is opposed to the 
welfare state, and public polic ies are mostly conservative. There arc, 
however, some striking historical sinularities that facilitate a comparative 
study of labor law and labor relations in America and Sweden. The for-
mative period of industrialization was from the 1860s to the 1930s, the 
economic philosophy in those years was liberal or even laissez-faire; the 
role of government in the economic sphere and the size of the public 
sector were rather limited. Both countries were devoted to the freedom of 
expression and the rule of law. Since de Tocqueville America was known 
as the harbor of numerous associations. Even to this clay, Americans are 
more active than Europeans in voluntary associations, with the exception 
of labor unions.2 In Sweden popular organizations such as cooperatives , 
l. Repol'I of the Commission 011 Jnd11s1rial Relations in Sweden, with Appendices (1938). 
2. Seymour Martin Lipset, American £.rcep1io11alis111: A Douhle-Ed11ed Sword (New York and London: 
W.W. Norton & Co., 1997) 278-79. The United States leads in the proponion of people who do unpaid work 
for voluntary associations, according to World Values Survey 1990. 
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free churches, educationa l and temperance associations were plentiful 
and important. Sweden, too, was rather unaffected by feudalism, farmers 
were never subjected to setfdom, the economic dominance of the nobility 
had been broken by the king in the seventeenth century, no social revolu-
tion had produced a lasting hostility between social groups, and there was 
always some local autonomy. 
In the middle of the nineteenth century Sweden was, however, more 
conservative and Jess democratic than America . Anyone trying to look 
into the future of labor relations would have guessed that Americans, not 
Swedes, would in time build a great and powerful labor movement. The 
Workingmen's Party in Philadelphia , founded in the 1820s, is believed to 
be the first labor party in the world . 
Labor law is an element of both American and Swedish exception-
alism. We can hardly find two other western countries more different 
with regard to the relations between the state on the one hand and 
employers/workers on the other. Three propositions will be made here. 1) 
Intervention by public authorities in labor relations was massive and 
overwhelmingly anti union in America in the formative period of industri-
alization , while it was mini mal in Sweden. 2) Legal restrictions on the 
unions in America undermined a potenti ally strong labor movement, 
reducing its size and pushing its policies in a conservative direction. The 
near-absence of regulation helped Swedish workers to build perhaps the 
strongest labor unions in the world. 3) The organizational strength of the 
workers in a modern society is a major factor in the shaping of public 
policy. In the following these claims will be examined more closely with 
a view to clarifying the po liti cal significance of intervention by public 
authorities in labor relations . 
Tuo Extreme Models 
1. Labor Law and Public Intervention in the United States 
The Constitution of the United States was based on the idea of popular 
government, and its founders wrestled with the complications of majority 
rule. In The Federalist letter 10 , James Madison emphasized the neces-
sity to "break and control the violence of faction ." To him the unequal 
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distribution of property was the most common and durable source of fac-
tion. "Those who hold and those who are without property have ever 
formed distinct interests in society." The regulation of such interests was 
"the principal task of modern legislation." Alexander Hamilton believed 
that the judiciary, having no power over the sword or the purse , would be 
of little danger to the rights of the citizens: "It may truly be said to have 
neither FORCE nor WILL but merely judgment; and must ultimately 
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judg-
ment." The general liberty of the people could "never be endangered 
from that quarter." The courts of justice should "declare all acts contrary 
to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void" (letter 78) . 
The courts became a powerful and highly conservative element. 
William Blackstone's law commentaries in the 1760s were probably 
more important in America than in England , where their influence was 
challenged by the Benthamites .3 Legal traditionalism ruled , in spite of the 
radical and egalitarian principles of the American Revolution. 
In 1806 eight men were found guilty of a combination to raise their 
wages in the so-called Philadelphia Cordwainers (shoemakers) case . 
They were sentenced to fines of about a week's pay, based on the 
common Jaw doctrine of criminal conspiracy. Conspiracy trials were tests 
of the validity of English common law. The outcome of the Philadelphia 
trial has been described as a climax in the debate between the Hamilto-
nian federalists, advocating common law as a means to maintain the 
unity of the legal system , and Jeffersonian anti-federalists, who saw 
common law as a part of the ancien regime .4 The common law doctrine 
of master and servant was upheld by the judiciary and provided legal 
sanction for employers' authori ty.5 
Courts in several states followed the precedent in Philadelphia; 
workers were convicted of conspiracy, strikes were broken up, associa-
tions disbanded. In 1842, however, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts 
ruled that labor organizations and workers ' concerted action , even 
3. Louis Hartz, The Liberal 'fraditio11 in America (New York: Harcourt , Brace, 1955) 45. 
4. Victoria C. Hullam, LL1bor Visions and S1a1e Power: The Origin of /Jusine.u U11io11i.vm in file U11i1ed 
Simes (Princeton University Press, 1993) 47-56. 
5. David Montgomery, Citizen Worker: 711e l!.xperie11ce of Workers in 1ile U11i1ed Sw1es wi1h Democracy 
and the Free Market d11ri11g 1he Ni11etee111h Ce111111y (Cambridge University Press, 1995) 5. 
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strikes, could be legitimate, depending on their aim. That was a turning 
point, and it was only after the Civil War that the conspiracy doctrine was 
again used by the courts to contain workers ' combinations. Businessmen 
and manufacturers were also sometimes found guilty of conspiracy. 
Workers embraced the conspiracy doctrine as a restriction on banks and 
monopolies. With broad consent the courts took it upon themselves to 
regulate workers' collective struggles.6 
Still , before the Civi l War workers were freer to act collectively in 
America than anywhere in Europe. Popular associations were subjected 
to far less police supervision. "For working people the most important 
part of the Jeffersonian legacy was the shelter it provided for free associ-
ation , diversity of beliefs and behavior," writes David Montgomery.7 
After the war, economic change and social turmoil made the work-
place a central battleground between capital and labor. There were 
numerous conspiracy verdicts in labor disputes, with frequent references 
to the property rights of private owners rather than , as before 1842, to the 
public good. The atmosphere was now heated, and penalties were up to 
three years and eight months in pri son and bail terms as high as one thou-
sand dollars .8 
Some labor unions, socialist groups and progressive movements called 
for legislation to protect the workers against biased , repressive courts. 
The legislators in New York and Pennsylvani a enacted laws several times 
to limit the conspiracy doctrine to cases of force, tlu·eats, and intimida-
tion. Peaceful collective action was to be exempt. Legal disputes often 
focused on intimidation, and the courts were now strict; almost all sorts 
of collective action were construed as intimidation. An impressive picket 
line or the circulation of leaflets could be unlawful if it brought the power 
of the organization to bear on fellow workers . Judge George Barrett in 
New York wrote in a verdict 1886: "The men who walk up and down in 
front of a man's shop may be guilty of intimidation , though they never 
raise a finger or utter a word. Their attitude may, nevertheless , be that of 
menace." In almost every conspiracy trial in New York the workers were 
found guilty, in spite of the anti-conspiracy acts. In Pennsylvani a, too , the 
6. Hattam 60-69, 105-07. 
7. Montgomery 4 , 6. 
8. Hallam 69-72. 
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courts extended the definition of intimidation in a way that rendered the 
legislative protection of the right to collective action meaningless .9 
Legislati ve provisions were almost the same in Great Britain as in New 
York and Pennsylvania. However, in interpreting "intimidation" the 
British courts deferred to Parliament and recognized the collective rights 
of the workers. The profound difference between America and Britain 
was not in the legal principles but in the relationship between the legisla-
tors and the courts. w 
From the mid-1 880s the conspiracy doctrine was gradually replaced 
by the instrument of labor injunctions. Judges could prohibit strikes and 
boycotts considered illegal and all measures in support of such actions, 
for instance demonstrations. No jury trial was required, and injunctions 
could be issued on the basis of affidavits without an opportunity for the 
defendants to respond. Contempt of court was a formidable sanction. 
Many injunctions prohibited interfering with the plaintiff 's business in 
any manner whatsoever. To forestall intimidation a judge could limit the 
number of pickets at a particular place, or even prohibit picketing or 
demonstrations as potential ly unlawful. The courts "deemed picketing 
inherently intimidating," writes William E. Forbath. Injunctions trans-
formed peaceful demonstrations into scenes of arrests and street vio-
lence, encouraging employers and the press to portray stiikers and unions 
as lawless .11 Though industrial action was in principle legal , thousands of 
strikes were met with restrictive measures . Federal injunctions were 
sought by the employers in the major strikes and tended to gu ide the rul-
ings in the state courts.12 Many labor leaders, among them Samuel Gom-
pers, the president of the AFL, and Eugene Debs, a future leader of the 
Socialist Party, openly defied labor injunctions . They were charged with 
contempt and sentenced to jail. 13 
9. Hatta111 72, 140-52 . 
10. 1-lattam 193-94. 
11 . Melvyn Dubofsky, The State & Labor in Modem America (Chapel Hill: The University of Norlh Car-
ol ina Press, 1994) 33; WiJJiam E. Forbath, I.aw and the Shapinx of the American La/Jur Mo1 •eme11t (Cam-
bridge. MA: Harvard University Press, 199 1) 109. 
12. Forbath eslirnales that federa l and state courts issued at least 4 300 labor injunctions between 1880 and 
1930 (6 1 ). Hal tam has olhcr figures: 524 reported labor injt1nc1ions 1880-1932 in state and federal cou11s and 
500 to I 000 unreported cases ( 163). 
13. Samuel Gompers, Seventy Years of Life and Labour: An Autobiography II (London: Hurst & Blackell, 
1925) 215; Dubofsky 30. 
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The AFL called for legislation against the use of labor injunctions. In 
1898, with the Erdman Act, Congress recognized the legitimacy of 
unions and banned the "yellow-dog contract" (prohibiting a worker to 
join a union) on interstate railways. The Industrial Commission in 1902 
recommended that the power of federal courts to issue labor injunctions 
should be restricted. The Clayton Antitrust Act in 1914 exempted the 
unjuns from the antitrust legislation and prohibited restraining orders or 
injunctions in disputes concerning terms or conditions of employment. 
But again the courts undermined the rights of labor. In 1908, the Supreme 
Court found that the anti-yellow-dog clause of the Erdman Act violated 
the freedom of contract. In the same year the court found strikers guilty 
of violating the She1man Act. In 1921, the Supreme Court (with William 
Howard Taft as chief justice) ruled that provisions in the Clayton Act 
concerning disputes between employer and employees applied only to 
disagreements between a named company and its workers, not to dis-
putes concerning all workers in a trade or an industry. The court sug-
gested that the law did not protect class warfare. In case after case, judges 
declared attempts by unions to organize an entire industry conspiracies to 
monopolize interstate commerce. Lt was considered illegal to organize 
workers who were bound to yellow-dog-contracts. 14 
Spontaneous local strikes were in most cases considered lawful , but 
judges found many arguments to prohibit industrial action: intimidation 
of strikebreakers, attempts to establish a closed shop , violation of prop-
erty rights and the freedom of contract, threats to federal property, 
obstruction of interstate commerce or traffic, and violation of antitrust 
legislation. Boycotts and sympathetic action affecting third parties were 
in many cases held illegal and condemned by some judges as "socialistic 
crime" or "the end of goverrunent." In the 1920s al most every other sym-
pathetic strike met with an anti-strike decree. 
Injunctions were intimately associated with employers ' use of armed 
guards. Employers' guards and even strikebreakers could be made deputy 
marshals by the courts or deputy sheriffs by police chiefs. Melwyn 
Dubofsky remarks that the Supreme Court, faced with contradictory 
14.Dubofsky34, 47,87, 10 1; Forbath 115, 156-57. 
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lower cowt rulings, invariably decided against labor. He concludes: 
" [F]ederal judges viewed strikes as disorderly by definition and as threats 
to the social order." 15 
The antilabor bearing of the courts was evident also in the judicial 
review. The courts struck down legislation about the freedom of associa-
tion, working hours, safety and health in the workplace, and payment of 
wages in legal currency. At the turn of the century the courts had elimi-
nated about 60 state and federal labor laws, in 1920, around 300.16 
Until the 1870s labor disputes were of direct concern only to the states, 
but as conflicts grew in size and bitterness the federal authorities felt 
compelled to intervene. Violence was widespread. In the rai lroad strikes 
in 1877 President Ruthe1ford B. Hayes dispatched the federal army to six 
states to restore order, to protect federal property, and to enforce court 
orders. The military, after having restored order, remained on duty to 
break even peacefu l strikes. In the Pullman strike in 1894, the executive 
branch again took the initiative. President Grover Cleveland obtained 
court orders prohibiting the workers to interfere with interstate commerce 
and mail, as a precondition for using armed forces to break the strike. 17 
From 1877 to 1903 federal or state troops were deployed in more than 
500 labor disputes. A comparison with French strike statistics in the 
1890s reveals how extreme the antagonism could be. Of JOO, 000 strikers 
in France three were injured , while in America two were killed and 140 
injured . In France 70 strikers of 100, 000 were arrested, in Tllinois at least 
700 and in New York at least 400. From 1902 to 1904 at least 198 people 
were killed in labor conflicts. 18 Many li ves were lost in the Pittsburgh 
railway strike in 1877 , the Homestead strike in 1892, the Pullman strike 
in 1894, in Little Creek in 1903, and in Ludlow in 191 3. Some periods 
were rather peaceful , for instance the years of prosperity in the 1920s, but 
much blood was shed again in the mid- ] 930s. Violence was frequent on 
both sides, and even conservative union leaders within the AFL were 
guilty of sabotage and other criminal acts. Responsible for the dyna-
I 5. Forbalh 62, 65, 69, 7 1, 82-89. 11 2-14; Dubofsky 15- I 6 , 21. 45. 
16. Forbalh 38. 
17. Dubofsky 8-1 3, 24-32. 
18. Forha1h 106, 118. 
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miting of Los Angeles Times in 1910, where twenty people were killed , 
were officials in the Bridge and Structural Iron Workers. 19 
The legal nature of the employment relationship took on a new char-
acter when the courts, starting in the 1880s, ruled that contracts of 
employment could be terminated by either party at any time for any 
reason. Though the at-wi ll doctrine had a liberating effect on both sides, 
in a legal setting that was biased against the unions it meant greater inse-
curity for the workers. Workers' individual freedom was limited by 
vagrancy and tramp acts that made unemployment an offence.20 
The downturn of the economy after 1929 was a drastic change. In 1932 
a Republican-dominated Congress eliminated labor injunctions as legal 
instruments and excluded the unions from the Sherman Act through the 
near-unanimous adoption of the Norris-LaGuard ia Act, which marked 
the end of the Old Order in the labor market.2 1 
2. Swedish Labor Law: Collective Laissez-faire 
An old Swedish system of strict labor regulation was undermined by eco-
nomic change and the influence of liberal ideas. In 1846, the guild system 
was abolished , and from 1864 laissez-faire was the basis of economic 
policy. The predominant legal doctrine concerning labor was the free 
employment contract. Employment was, as a rule, based on an informal 
agreement that could be ended without a fixed notice. Pre-modern regu-
lations, technically still valid , about master and servant were soon di sre-
garded. The guilds had left a vacuum, a part of which was for some time 
filled by workers ' organizations of a self-help character. There were 
occasional spontaneous strikes. The trade union movement took off in the 
1880s, mostly among skilled workers, and the first strike organized by a 
union occUJred in 1883 in Stockholm. 
Liberal and sociali st unionists agreed on union strategies but were bit-
19. James Weinste in , Tile Corporate Ideal i11 tlie Liberal State 1900-1918 (Bos1011: Beacon Press, 1968) 
173-78 . 
20. Montgomery 158. 
21. Dubofsky 104. 
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terly divided on socialism. From the early 1890s the socialists led most of 
the unions , which were to some extent coordinated by the Social Demo-
cratic Party, founded in 1889. The unions acted within a sphere that leg-
islation left almost completely unregulated , and relatively few disputes 
between employers and workers were brought to the courts. A strike was 
not generally regarded as a breach of the employment contract. There 
was no general regul ation of non-commercial associations.22 
Coercion through violence or threats was an offense, and in 1 892 such 
coercion in connection with industria l conflicts was made a matter for 
public prosecution. In 1894, sheet-metal workers in a small company in 
Stockholm went on strike. Four of them were indicted for havi ng resorted 
to "coercion by threats" vis-a-vis other workers, but the Supreme Court 
found them innocent in 1898. The attorney for the defense was Karl 
Staaff, a young lawyer who later became the leader of the Liberal party 
and twice prime minister.23 
The crucial legal question concerned the meaning of "threat" in the 
penal code. Must it be a threat of a criminal or illegal act, or could it be 
some other kind of intimidation? This was a matter of dispute within the 
judiciary as late as the 1930s . The statute gave no answer. In some cases 
union mili tants were convicted of having threatened workers that they 
would be "treated as strikebreakers" or that their names would be pub-
lished in labor newspapers. When such cases were brought to the 
Supreme Court, the majority of the judges voted in favor of acquittal .24 
The rulings helped the unions to organize workers and to exert pressure 
in disputes. Around the turn of the century " the field was open to the free 
play of the forces: the two sides in the labor market had to shape the 
fotms of their re lationships and to take responsibility for the order they 
wanted to establish." The unions fo und that they had to rely on their own 
resources, and so did the employers.25 
22. Tage Lindborn , Oen svemka fackfiire11i11gsriire/sens 11ppko111s1 oc/1 tidigare hi.woria 1872-1900 (Stock-
holm: Landsorganisationen, 1938) 34, 54-56,73. 11 9-24; Jiirgen Westerstahl. Svensk fnckftire11i11g.,.,.;;re/se: 
Orga11isa1io11spla11. Verk.wmlretlformer. Forluillande iii/ l"f(lfl!ll (Stockholm: Tidcn. 1945) 9- 15; Axel Adlcr-
creutz, Kollektivavtalet: Studier iiver dess 1i//koms1his1oria (Lund: CWK Gleemp, 1954) 227-5 1. 
23. Svante Nycandcr, "Vad anser liberaler om fackriireningar?" Arbetnrhiswria 4 (2003): 12-13. 
24 . Stntens <!tfe111/iga 111red11 i11gar, SOU 1933:36 (84-90). 
25 . Adlercreut7, 230. 
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From 1905 the Liberal party, led by Karl Staaff, was in a key position 
in all legislative matters. It was the largest party in the elections until 
19 14 and held the balance in the Swedish Parliament unti l 1933. ln the 
liberal view, legislation on trade unions should wait until the workers had 
full political rights. Conservative governments and members of Parlia-
ment introduced several antiunion proposals, all of which were defeated 
in the lower house. After a general strike and lock-out in 1909 the con-
servative government assumed that there would be a majority for legisla-
tion.Far-reaching proposals introduced in 1910 and 1911 were, however, 
defeated in Parliament. The Supreme Court ruled in 19 15 that collective 
agreements were legally binding.26 
Only in 1928 , after many decades of numerous industrial conflicts, did 
the Swedish Parliament legislate concerning collective agreements and 
the establi shment of a Labor Court. Collective action was prohibited in 
disputes about the interpretation of an existing agreement. Both unions 
and individual workers could be held responsible for illegal action. Max-
imum damages for a worker was about a week's pay. The unions and the 
social democrats fought bitterly against the law but soon learned to 
appreciate the increased stability of the system of collective agreements. 
The Labor Court protected management rights but put the burden of 
proof on employers in di sputes about the right to organize, which was 
protected in the collective agreements (not in the law). The legislation 
reflected principles that the SAF and the LO had already agreed upon .27 
LO hi storian Ragnar Casparsson wrote in the 1940s that a sawmill 
strike in 1879 was the on ly significant exception to the rule that the state 
had remained neutral in labor conflicts.28 Sweden was the best example 
of what Otto Kahn Freund call ed collective laissez-faire . Employers and 
unions shaped the rules of the game. 
26. Westerst~hl 283-333; Adlcrcrcutz 480-8 I. 
27. Westerst~hl 366-8 1. 
28. Ragnar Casparsson. LO under rvd drtio11de11 : 1924-1947 (Stockholm: Lan<lsorganisationen, 1948) 479. 
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How Labor Law Affected Employers and Unions 
1. Effects of American Government Intervention 
Until the 1930s, American employers could resist the unions confident 
that they were defending important principles of law. Had government 
remained neutral, the employers would have been more inclined to 
accommodate organized labor and more inclined to unite for a collective 
defense against workers ' industrial action. 
The unions were shaped by the resistance they met. Business unionism 
became a logical choice after years of fruitless political struggle. Craft 
unions with social cohesion and well-paid members, who could not 
easily be replaced with st1;kebreakers, could survive and even prosper, 
but only few attempts to organize unskilled workers in mass production 
industries succeeded. The unions stayed more moderate in size, less 
powerful , more vulnerable to attacks and more suspicious toward poten-
tially disloyal workers than they would have been in a tolerant legal envi-
ronment. Union density was smaller (about 11 percent of nonagricultural 
labor force) in 1930 than in 1904.29 The unions did not become a natural 
basis of a proletarian party. From the late 1890s the AFL opposed reforms 
sponsored by labor in Europe: old-age pensions, regulation of working 
hours , and unemployment insurance.30 Some union constitutions prohib-
ited political action. "[V]oluntarists saw government interference in the 
economy as necessarily anti-union ," according to David Greenstone.31 
The conservative tendency was particularly strong in the 1920s, when 1 
labor was on the defensive.32 
Samuel Gompers said in 1883 that the strong arm of the government 
was on the side of the employers. "The police and the military are used 
against labor and even the good will of order-lov ing citizens is employed 
to crush us. r .. . ] Federal and state laws deny us the right to unite." In his 
memoirs , he stressed the importance of a cautious, non-political union 
strategy. Radicalism and sensationali sm concentrated all the forces of 
organized society against the labor movement. "I saw the danger of ' 
29. Daniel Nelson, Shifti1111 Fort1111es: 7/1e Rise a11d /Jecli11e ufAmerica11 l.abor,.fi-om the 1820s to the Pre-
se/I/ (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1997) 4. 10-11 , 13, 67; Montgomery 153-55. 
30 . Hauam 4-6; Forbath 16-18. 
3 1. Weinstein 8 , 22. 
32 . David Greenslonc. Lti /Jor i11 American Polit ics (Chicago: The Unive rsity of Chicago Press, 1969) 25, 
28. 
ON THE IMPORTANCE OF LABOR LAW 45 
entangling allfances with intellectuals who did not understand that to 
experiment with the labor movement was to experiment with human 
life."33 The craft unions in the AFL found that attempts to organize 
unskilled workers in the mass production industries could be both diffi-
cult and dangerous, and they often resisted such attempts.34 
The unending struggle in the courts forced union officials to speak the 
language of the prevailing legal philosophy. Collective interests had to be 
converted into individual rights. The whole gospel of the movement, 
Gompers said , is summed up in one phrase, freedom of contract. The 
AFL often cited the freedom of speech and prohibition of slavery clauses 
in the Constitution. When strikes were said to be a violation of property 
rights, the AFL argued that property rights in human labor means invol-
untary servitude. The AFL demanded that the principles of the market 
economy should be applied imparti ally.35 
Around the tum of the century many federal officials and business 
leaders wanted to promote a conservative unionism without substantially 
changing the power relations. The founders of the National Civic Federa-
tion saw themselves as crusaders for better relations between capital and 
labor. Craft unions such as the railway Brotherhoods and cautious AFL 
leaders were to be recru ited to protect America against the dangers of 
socialist militants and industrial unionism. Samuel Gompers and John 
Mitchell of the United Mine Workers joined the businessmen in the Fed-
eration in campaigns against the spread of socialism.36 
2. Disagreement among American Scholars 
Historians in the Marxist and Beard traditions tend to believe that polit-
ical institutions and legal systems rniITor class divisions. Anthony Woodi-
wiss has observed, there is often a tacit assumption that, in a capitalist 
society, "the law necessarily and uniformly reflects capital 's domi-
33. Gompers I 83, 97, J9 J , 203, 235. 
34. Greenslone 24 . 
35. Weinstein 6-1 2; Dubofsky 10 I , 235; Forbath J 30-33. 
36. Gompers was the vice-president of the Federation from its start in 1900 until his death in 1924; Mitchell 
was an active member 1904- 1908. 
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nance."37 A glance at America and Sweden 1864-1930 makes the inaccu-
racy of this assumption obvious. 
There is a remarkable absence of consensus among American labor 
historians. A myriad of books and articles during a hundred years about 
American exceptionalism has not established a generally accepted view 
of the signif icance of the antiunion stance of the government. There is, 
for instance, a great difference between hi storians William Forbath , Vic-
toria Hattam, and Melvyn Dubofsky and , on the other hand , political 
scientists Seymo ur Martin Lipset and Gary Marks. 
Forbath: " [J]udge-made law and legal violence limited, demeaned, and 
demoralized workers' capacities for class-based social and political 
action." Dubofsky: " [TJhe policies and actions of the state substantially 
shaped the hi story of working people and movements that they built." 
Hattam: " I A] strong judic iary created a politically weak labor movement 
in the United States."38 These and other scholars have described labor law 
traditions as a part of America's social and political hi story, and together 
they cannot fail to convince the reader that the government severely 
repressed the unions and undermined workers' influence both in the fac-
tories and in the political sphere. The conspiracy doctrine and the labor 
injunctions , as applied by the courts , in addition to judic ial review and 
police and military intervention in labor disputes made America the 
opposite of Sweden among western countries. 
Dubofsky has observed that the unions in America have grown in 
periods when workers and uni ons have had a relatively amicable rela-
tionship with the government, as during the two world wars and the New 
Deal years. These were eras when the political system "operaleu to pro-
mote stability by furthering the interests of workers and their organiza-
tions." The importance of the government is equally obvious in the 
periods of union decline, as in the 1920s and the 1980s.39 
Seymour Martin Lipset in American Exceptionalism, and Lipset and 
Gary Marks in It Didn't Happen Here, touch very lightl y upon labor law 
37. Anlhony Woodiwiss, "Colonialism and the Developmcnl in Hong Kong.' ' in M . van der Linden and R. 
Price . eds., The Rise and Deve/op111e111 of Collective Labour Law (Amslerdam: International [nslilute of Social 
History, 2000) 382. 
38. Forbulh 168: Dubofsky xii; Hallam ix. 
39. Dubofsky xvii . 
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and its possible effects.'m Their main focus is on the absence of a large 
sociali st party. The failure of socialism and the failure of unionism are 
seen as two parallel phenomena. Lipset writes: 
The fact that the American national tradit ion is egalitarian , anti-eli ti st, ind ividualistic, 
and class ically liberal, has weakened efforts to mobili ze workers and others on behalf 
of socialist and collec ti vist objectives, including un ions . [ . .. ] The Ameri can social 
structure and values foster the free market and competitive ind ividualism , an orienta-
tion which is not congruent with class consciousness , support for socialist or social 
democratic parties or a strong trade union movement. 
In Lipset's view, American workers are less class conscious than workers 
in Europe because of the absence of a feudal past, a relati vely egalitarian-
status structure, an achievement-oriented value system, comparative 
affluence, and a history of political democracy.41 Lipsct has many fore-
runners. Friedrich Engels , Werner Sombart, Antonio Gramsci, and Max 
Weber were among those who believed , with David Greenstone, that the 
greatest obstacle of the labor movement was "the absence of a European 
class consciousness or solidarity as nineteenth-century American society 
lacked inherited feudal institutions and class distinctions."42 
In the traditional interpretation of American exceptionali sm, repres-
sion of the unions is deemphasized. This is partly because the main focus 
is on socialism rather than on workers' organizations , partly because the 
belief that workers' attitudes were shaped by inherited , common Amer-
ican values does not go well together with the fact that workers were bru-
tally repressed when they made use of one of the American liberties. 
Ethnic and cultural divisions, a relative affluence, and social mobi lity 
may have reduced the propensity of the workers to organize. The spirit of 
the Declaration of Independence may have made socialism seem less 
attractive, though this argument hardly applies to immigrant workers. 
Federalism and the electoral system made it difficult to establish a 
40. Seymour Martin Lipsel and Gary Marks, It Didn't Happen //ere: Wiry Socialism Failed in the United 
State (New York and London: W.W. Norlon & Co., 2000). The imroductory overview of 1hc lilcralure on 
Ameiican exceplionalism does no1 menlion governmelll repression of labor unions as a possi ble explanalion 
of the weakness of socialism. The authors' evalua1ion of lhe impo11ance of repression refers only 10 repression 
of communisls and 01hcr left-wing groups (237-60). The histo ry of labor law is not included in 1he story lhey 
te ll. 
41. Lipset 95 , 108-09. 
42. Lipset and Marks 2 1-24, 263-29: Greenstone 18. 
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socialist party. But arguments about socialism and socialist parties do not 
automatically apply to unioni sm. Professional groups, farmers, house 
owners, and others are often highly organized without being class con-
scious or guided by political mi litants . 
Were American workers, in the formative period , less class conscious 
than workers in Europe? Military intervention in 500 labor disputes 
proves lhe reality of a class conflict. Kim Voss writes that labor historians 
have published "study after study demonstrating instances of class-con-
scious activity in nineteenth-century America that rivaled that of 
working-class movements in Europe." In the middle of the 1830s, 
between one-fifth and one-third of all urban workers were organized. The 
labor movements in America , England and France seem to have been 
close to one another in the way they envisaged an alternative economic 
system . Voss writes: "In the m.id-1880s it did not look as if the American 
labor movement wou ld turn out to be the weakest and the most conserva-
tive." His study of the Knights of Labor in New Jersey revealed that 
alliances and solidarity played a prominent role in the mobilization of the 
workers . Skilled workers were both craft and class conscious .43 
We may still accept the argument that the liberal and democratic char-
acter of American society made socialist ideas less attractive. But labor 
unions are not in themselves political . They are reactions to a sense of 
insecurity in a competitive market economy subjected to business cycles 
and to the inequality of the employment relationship; to be employed is 
to be obliged to obey. Once unions are established they try to influence 
public policy, like other organizations, and they tend to be reformist and 
egalitarian. 
Lipset quotes the conclusion by Freeman and Medoff that "opposition, 
broadly defined , is a major cause of the slow strangulation of private 
sector unionism" in America. He agrees with them that the legal environ-
ment in Canada, where union density is much higher, is more union 
friendly than in America , but he believes that workers in Canada have a 
greater propensity for joining unions to begin with . In any case , the dif-
ference in government policies between the two countries "only raises 
the conundrum one step further." In Lipset's view, varying labor laws 
43. K. Voss, American £rceprionali.rn1: Tire K11igh1s of Lnbor and Class Formatio11 in the Ni11e1ee111/r Ce11· 
1111) ' (Ithaca: Corne ll University Press, 1993) xi, 30,42, 236. 
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reflect the prevailing norms and mores of the wider society. 44 What 
causes the weakness of socialist parties, unionism and class conscious-
ness, also causes antilabor public policy and labor law. This theory is true 
almost by definition. Who wou ld deny that the law is shaped by pre-
vailing norms? But the specific character and effects of government 
restrictions on the unions should not be seen as matters of only secondary 
importance. 
Sanford M. Jacoby has argued that the concept of exceptionalism can 
as easily be applied to American employers as to the workers. An in-
grained hostility among employers against the unions goes a long way 
toward explaining low union density and lack of labor radicalism. Jacoby 
believes that the antiunion attitude has deep roots in American history. 
The weakness and lack of cohesion of the American government made 
the large corporations exceptionally powerful and independent. Em-
ployers did not have to make alliances with other groups to achieve their 
goals . Jacoby admits that this is a speculative argument, and he maintains 
that the antiunion attitude of the employers can be explained also by the 
American unions ' highly decentralized approach to collective bargaining. 
The fact that the unions concern themse lves with a variety of detailed 
aspects of working conditions at the plant level provide American 
employers with a stronger incentive to resist unions than employers usu-
ally have in countries where industry-wide bargaining is the norm. 
This incentive cannot, however, explain the difference between Amer-
ican and European employers in the formative period. Early unionism 
almost everywhere takes a decentralized approach. Whether industry-
widc bargaining takes place or not depends on complicated economic and 
institutional circumstances and cannot be explained simply in terms of 
labor strategies. In many countries workers have been denied important 
instruments of industry-wide solidarity, in particular the right to sec-
ondary action. 
Jacoby maintains that American employers have had greater economic 
resources to carry out antiunion campaigns than employers el sewhere. 
On average, Ame1ican firms and plants have been larger and more di s-
persed than their counterparts owing to the early development of mass 
production and the great size of the American market. Again, this is an 
44. Lipset 105 . 
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unconvincing argument with regard to the early period, when the great 
countries in Europe could still be compared with America in population 
and production. And if American employers had more money for cam-
paigns, so had the workers. 
Employers in America did not, as Jacoby notes, depend only on their 
own resources. Not only did the government allow the private use of 
force by employers , it also regularly provided direct assistance during 
labor disputes. State militias were reactivated after the Civil War "pri-
marily to police labor disputes ," and federal troops "participated in the 
suppression of several critical strikes." Local employers "had an easier 
time swaying state and local units to act on their behalf than did Euro-
pean employers." Jacoby does not emphasize the role of the courts , but 
he believes that government intervention "weakened and fragmented the 
labor movement." However, "what underlay these factors [i.e. govern-
ment intervention] was the unusually high degree of political power 
enjoyed by the American employers ." So in the end labor law is a matter 
of only secondary interest, to Jacoby as to Lipset.45 
Did the employers really sway the courts, even the Supreme Court? 
The independence of the judiciary distinguishes America as much as the 
power of the employers. Consider the Supreme Court verdict in 1894 
after federa l troops had suppressed the Pullman strike: 
The strong arm of the national government may be put forth lo brush away all obstruc-
tions to interstate wmmeree or to the transportation of the mails. Tf the emergency 
arises , the army of the nation, and a ll its militia , arc at the service of the nation to 
compel obedience to its laws.46 
These words of the highest legal authority cannot be dismissed as just an 
example of the unusual influence of the employers. The courts had the 
power to shape labor law. Why the courts ~ctect in a way that weakened 
and fragmented workers' organizations is beyond the scope of the present 
discussion. What matters is that it happened. David Montgomery comes 
close to the truth when he writes about the "deci sive confrontation 
45. Sanford M . Jacoby, "American Exceptionalis m Revisited: The importance of Management." in S. M. 
Jacoby, ed., Masters to Manag ers: Hi.,·torical a nd Compara1ive Perspec1ives 011 American £111ployers (New 
York: Columbia University Press. 199 1) 183-200. 
46. /n Ne Debs, quoted in Montgomery 97 . 
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between the working class and the state in the years 1919-22 ."47 The gov-
ernment itself was the most formidable opponent of organized labor. 
3. Sweden - Cumulative Growth of Organizations 
Already in 1930, about 80 percent of all workers in the manufacturing 
industry in Sweden were covered by collective agreements . In the middle 
of the 1930s union density was higher than in any other country. The 
unions had become powerful before the Social Democratic Party had 
been able to introduce labor market policies or unemployment insurance 
favorable to the unions. How much did the absence of state intervention 
contribute? 
Around the turn of the century conflicts about the right to organize 
were numerous . The largest battle was in the sawmill industry in 1899. 
The unions were weak and the strike was broken, but the workers had a 
powerful ally in the public opinion. Most of the newspapers and many 
outspoken members of the intelligentsia supported the workers .48 
The employers found that struggles about the right to organize were 
unrewarding and developed another strategy. The SAF was fou nded in 
1902 as a reaction to a nation-wide strike for the right to vote. The break-
through of employer- labor relations was an agreement in the metal 
industry in 1905, after a lock-out of nearly five months. General elections 
were held at the time of the confl ict, resulting in a majority of liberals and 
social democrats in the lower chamber. In most countries conflicts of thi s 
magnitude and economic importance were broken off by the state , but the 
Swedish employers could not count on any support from the state and 
accepted a compromise. The right to organize was established as a mutu-
ally binding principle , and a minimum wage for all adult workers was 
established. In 1906 the SAF and the LO agreed , under the threat of a 
broad lock-out, on basic pri nciples of labor relations. The employers rec-
47. David Momgomery, The Fall of 1he l/ause of Labor: '/11e Workplace, 1/ie Sime and A111erira11 Labor 
Ac1ivis111 , 1865-1925 (Cambridge University Press, 1987) :no. 
48. Svante Nycander, Mak1e11 over arbe1s111ark11ade11 : Ell perspekfiV /Jli Sverifies 1900-fal (Stockholm: SNS 
Fiirlag, 2002) I 9-20, 9 I . 
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ognized the right of workers to organize in exchange for the unions' 
acceptance of management rights, including the right freely to employ and 
dismiss workers. The SAF later established , against the will of the LO, the 
right to sympathetic action as an exception to the obligation to keep the 
industrial peace during the contract period. The sympathetic lock-out was 
the preferred weapon of the employers. The national organizations took 
upon themselves to create a modus vivendi, a set of rules about industrial 
action, bargaining, and agreements, with the role of the state limited to 
voluntary mediation. This chain of events was influenced by the example 
of Denmark but very different from what happened elsewhere. 
In the years following the breakthrough, union density increased rapidly, 
but tensions were severe, and much against the cautious strategy of the LO 
leadership a number of local conflicts escalated into a general strike in 
1909. The unions were defeated and union membership declined. Gradu-
ally, however, bargaining and collective agreements were extended in a 
cumulative process where the two sides helped to consolidate each other. 
As the SAF organized more employers, the coverage of the collective 
agreements reached at the branch level increased steadi ly. The employers 
wanted central control and industry-wide agreements, which favored uni-
form working conditions in each industry and gave central union leader-
ship a role as coordinator of union policies. To a large extent, employer sol-
idarity and labor solidarity worked in the same direction. This was the logic 
behind the harmonious situation described in the American report in 1938. 
Employers and unions had a common interest in industrial peace, a rational 
wage structure, increase in productivity and a high level of employment, 
and, above all , an autonomous system of labor relations. 
The course of events would have been very different if the state had 
followed the advice of angry employers and worried conservatives to 
intervene decisively against militant and abusive practices of the early 
socialist unions. The cumulative process starting in 1905 might never 
have been triggered. Leading employers were for a long time resolved 
not to recognize the unions. Productivity in industry was low, and the 
companies were exposed to international competition both as exporters 
and as employers; Swedish workers were emigrating in substantial num-
bers to America, where wages were higher. The rise of a rather militant 
unionism was a serious threat, and the strategy adopted in 1905 and 1906 
was not an easy choice . The neutral and passive attitude of the state made 
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it imperative for employers to organize. James Fulcher has observed that 
in Britain "the employers did not need to organize because the state took 
on the task of containing the unions" .49 Strong employer organizations 
were essential for the development of an autonomous and stable system 
of collective bargaining in Sweden . 
4. Scholars Deemphasize the Effects of Swedish Collective 
Laissez-faire 
The fact that state intervention in labor relations has been very limited in 
Sweden has been recognized by many scholars , among them Fulcher.50 
Nils Elvander, a former professor of labor relations , has confirmed that 
"the old bourgeois Sweden was a welcoming environment for the incip-
ient labor movement, compared to the conditions in most other countries 
where the social consequences of industrialization were met with antiu-
nion legislation or direct repression."51 The effects on union density and 
labor relations have, however, seldom been emphasized. Misconceptions 
concerning the Swedish Model are frequent. They touch upon the early 
history of the unions, the role of the state and the law, and the process 
through which the employers and the unions eventually could meet in 
mutual respect. Research on Swedish labor relations in the twentieth cen-
tury has been much influenced by the self-image of the labor movement , 
where the resistance of the "bourgeois society" is emphasized rather than 
the level of tolerance on the part of the state. The Supreme Court's union-
friendly ruling in the Lothigius case in 1998, and the labor law alliance 
between the liberals and the social democrats have not been included in 
Swedish labor history.52 
Tn Pnlitir:s against Markets Gosta Esping-Andersen argues that " the 
Swedish society did not give rise to a large and liberal -minded class of 
49. J. Fulcher, l..nbour Movemen1s, Employers, and the Srme: Co11jlic1 and Co-operation in /) ri1ai11 and 
Sweden (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991 ) 129. 
50. J. Fulcher, "Sweden." in S. Berger and D. Broughton , eds., The Force of l..l1hor (Oxford: Berg, 1995) 
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5 1. Nils Elvander. Review or S. Nycander (2002). Ekonomi.~k Debem 5 (2002): 465. 
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farmers and urban bourgeoisie." He believes that confrontations in the 
Swedish labor market have been sharper than in Denmark "because of 
the absence of a powerful liberal influence" and that the social democrats 
"had no natural coalition partners" in matters important to the unions. He 
regards classes as the primary actors in political life and tends to see the 
policies of the liberals as a reflection of the interests of farmers, who 
" [have seen] organized labor as a threat." He further holds that "existing 
legislation as well as government practice placed restrictions on the trade 
unions' freedom of action."53 These statements are misleading. The 
liberal protection of the unions in legi slative matters has been decisive, as 
has been recognized by James Fulcher and Nils Elvander. State restric-
tions on the unions in Sweden dming the twentieth century were min-
imal, by any comparison.54 
Sociologists Walter Korpi , Anders Kjellberg, and Goran Therborn 
have analyzed why the Swedish labor movement became so successful. 
They rightly emphasize the absence of ethnic and religious divisions 
among the workers, and the importance of a relatively high degree of 
political unity among the workers; a long period of competition between 
liberals and socialists in the unions, as in England , might have been a 
handicap.55 In particular, the absence of a large immigration and of prob-
lems related to race made Sweden different from America in the labor 
market. The suggestion here is not that only labor law mattered , but the 
fact that the state did very little to restrain worker 's collective action 
clearly facilitated both union growth and an autonomous system of bar-
gaining. Sweden was exceptional also in a European setting. 
5. Cross-class Alliances in Sweden and America 
In Capitalists against Markets, Peter A. Swenson compares employer 
strategies in Sweden and America . In both countries he finds important 
53. Glisla Esping-Andersen, Politics agaimt Markets: The Social De111ocratic l?oad to Power (Princclon 
University Press, 1985) xv, 37 , 82-87, 314, 3 15. 
54. Fulcher ( 1991 ) 316; E lvandcr 465; Westcrsl~hJ 310, 338-43; Nycander (2002) 5 1-54. 
55 . Nycurn.lcr (2002) 91-99, 448; Esping-Anderscn 315; Anders Kjellberg, Facklig orga11i"ering i talv 
/tinder (Lund: Ark iv Forlag , 1983) 215-17. 
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"cross-class alliances" between capital and labor based on common inter-
ests. In Sweden key employers after l905-1906 promoted collective, 
centralized bargaining and were ready to use massive lock-outs to protect 
management rights and to control the general wage level. Employers and 
many unions had a common interest in preventing wages in industries 
where competition was weak (in paiticular the building trades) from di s-
rupting the wage structure .56 In some American industries established 
producers sometimes met ruinous price competition based on the 
exploitation of recent immigrants and black workers. In bituminous coal 
production , garment industry, building and construction, employers and 
workers both wanted to regulate competition . The idea was simple: "The 
industry needed the Union to protect it from the demoralization of cut-
throat competition." Leading producers encouraged the workers to orga-
nize and to enforce a minimum standard of wages and working condi-
tions in all firms in the industry. Where employers cooperated in this way, 
the unions did wel l. Bargaining "was virtually always multiemployer in 
character" and the union density was ai·ound 50 percent in the period 
before the New Deal.57 Capital-intensive industries like steel and auto-
mobile production did not have to face competition from sweat-shops, 
and they were not as dependent on international markets as the Swedish 
manufacturing industry. They did not want an alliance with organized 
labor. Swenson concludes that differences in employer interests shared 
with labor, rather than variations in their power against labor, helps to 
make sense of the diversity in employer-l abor relations .58 They also help 
explain the difference between Swedish and American employer strate-
gics. We should not forget, however, the firm determination of the big 
Swedish employers not to recognize the unions and the severe conflicts 
they fought on this matter until 1906. 
Swenson suggests that American machine shop and foundry owners 
"would have sorely envied their Swedish counterparts' success" in 1905, 
when the unions accepted managerial control and relinquished the closed 
shop, while militant American craftsmen "would have regarded the deal 
56. Peter A. Swenson, Capitalists agaimt Markets: The Making of Labor Markets and Welfare States i11 t/1e 
United Stales a11d Sweden (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) 76-77, 100. 
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with dismay and disgust."59 That may be true. The work practices and 
moral codes of American craftsmen were not easily overcome by the 
employers' regulation of production.60 However, managerial control and 
the open shop were not easily accepted by the metal workers in Sweden 
either. It happened only after a Jock-out of five months.61 In America, a 
mutual accommodation must have been extremely difficult to bring about 
after all the violent conflicts, injunctions , and police and military inter-
ventions at the request of employers. In the early twentieth century the 
unions had already been shaped by the resistance they had met. In a more 
union friendly legal environment, where routine workers had been able to 
organize, the craftsmen's grip on the unions would have been less firm. 
The closed shop, finally, was a defense against employers who discrimi-
nated against union members and was not easily given up, especially in 
the United States . 
The breakthrough of the American unions in 1937 was not an effect of 
large corporations reconsidering their interests. The employers, begin-
ning with General Motors, were forced to recognize the unions after a 
wave of major strikes in which the government refused to intervene. The 
profound change in labor relations is best understood against the back-
ground of the Norris-LaGuardia Act (1932) , the Wagner Act (1935), 
President Roosevelt 's pro-union stance in the 1936 landslide election, 
and the new liberal majority in the Supreme Court. When government 
policies changed, the American unions became a countervailing power in 
industry and a major force in politics. A suppressed alternative was 
emancipated. 
How Union Strength Affects Public Policy 
1. Union Membership and Political Participation 
In Sweden nobody questions the political importance of strong labor 
unions . Bo Rothstein maintains in The Social Democratic State that 
59. Swenson 79. 
60. Montgomery ( 1987) 43. 
61. Nycamlcr (2002) 22. 
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"labor 's basic power resource is its organization, and the basic organiza-
tion for labor is the union." The solid position of the Swedish unions is 
reflected in the unprecedented success of the social democrats.62 The 
party depends on the active support of thousands of union activists in 
election campaigns and on substantial financial contributions from the 
national unions. The political participation on the part of the workers is as 
high as that of other groups. Since the 1930s, public policy has been more 
egalitarian than in almost all other western count:ries.63 
Lipset and Marks note: "Comparative studies of public policy reveal 
that the organized strength of a society 's lower class is immensely influ-
ential for its public policy. The institutions created in a society - perhaps 
above all, the institutions that reflect the relative power or impotence of 
those at the bottom of a society and those at the top - shape a society 's 
response to economic change ."64 In the 1880s, American labor fielded its 
own candidates in two hundred towns and cities . In none of these, writes 
Montgomery, "did labor retain its grip on municipal offices after the 
defeat of union organization in the locality 's major enterprises." In most 
urban areas the organizational base of the Knights of Labor and the 
unions were destroyed by unsuccessful battles with the employers 
between 1887 and 1894. Without organi zations the "property less workers 
could not forge themselves into an effective political force." In Home-
stead , Pennsylvania, workers nominated by one party or another had a 
strong grip on local offices and legislative seats . This "workers' republic" 
was brought to an end when Carnegie Steel crushed the unions.65 
Many observations in America confirm that union strength is highly 
correlated with the political participation of workers, the outcome of 
elections, and public policy. In presidential e lections in the nineteenth 
century after 1852, voter turnout was less than 75 percent only once (in 
1872). After the turn of the century it gradually decreased to less than 50 
percent in 1920 and 1924. Voting reached a peak at 63 percent in the 
62. Bo Rothsten. Tire Social Democrmic Smte: The Swedish Model and the 811rea11cratic Problem of Social 
Reforms (Pi t1sburgh: University of Piusburgh Press, 1996) 3, 32. 
63 . Nycandcr (2002) 434. 
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Kennedy election in 1960, which was followed by a negative trend . 
When President Clinton was reelected in 1996 barely 49 percent partici-
pated.66 The variation during the twentieth century roughly followed the 
curve of union density. 
Walter Dean Burnham has found that the low turnout during the 1920s 
mirrored a lack of "incentive for the urban manual-labor workforce to 
participate in elections" and that the ascendancy of the Republican Party 
"was based in very large part upon this socially selective voter participa-
tion." ln the building of the New Deal coalition a conversion of former 
abstainers into Democrats was vitally significant.67 Greenstone maintains 
that the emergence of labor as a major nationwide electoral organization 
represent the most important change in the structure of the American 
party system since the war. Its impact was prutieularly strong in the first 
half of the 1960s.68 The unions are, according to a study of the presiden-
tial election in 1992, the best example of organizations dedicated to the 
mobi lization of voters. " rA]mong those with a high school education or 
less , belonging to a union adds nearly 20 percent to turnout levels over 
those who do not belong."69 
In 1960, 45 percent of the electorate identified themselves as De-
mocrats, 29 percent as Republicans. Since then the proportion of De-
mocrats has decreased while independent voters have become the largest 
group. The negative trend for the Democrats has an obvious connection 
with the decline of the unions. "On the Democratic side, the proportion of 
identifiers in union households continued a downward slide from about a 
third of the coalition in 1966 and earlier to just over a fifth in 1992," 
according to Democracy's Feast: Elections in America.10 The decline of 
the unions has diminished the relative strength of the Democratic Party 
and reduced the influence of workers within the party. 
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Labor union support was important when Democrats were elected 
presidents in 19 16, l944, 1948 and 1960.7 1 Scholars have documented 
that U.S. senators and congressmen have been influenced by the strength 
of the unions in their constituencies .72 Since the Kennedy-Johnson era, 
however, the balance between the left and the right, and between the 
interests of workers and the interests of large corporations, has changed 
profoundly. The government has not been neutral in the process . Shifts in 
the regulation of labor re lations, mainly through the federa l courts and 
the National Labor Relations Board, have made life much more difficult 
for the unions.73 
In American political discourse , a question which is asked again and 
again is why there is no sociali sm in the United States. A European style 
sociali st party is generally seen as the natural way of channeling the 
political aspirations of workers, yet no such party has emerged in 
America. In thi s discussion focus should be shifted from socialism to 
unions and from party structure to political participation on the part of 
workers. The basic question is why the unions are weak. If they had been 
stronger the basis for a broad labor party might have been better, but the 
influence of workers could also have been channeled through the existing 
two-party system, as it actually was during the New Deal period. In both 
cases the center of gravity in American politics would have moved to the 
left and come closer to present-day "socialism" in Western Europe. 
Lipset and Marks' main conclusion is this: "American values - political 
structure - heterogeneous working class - party/union split: the interac-
tion of these four factors holds the key to why socialists failed in 
America."74 The list ought to have included initiatives by public authori-
ties to restrain the unions. 
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nell Universily Press, 1988) 34-48. Nelson mainta ins that the Reagan administration made "a deliberate and 
largely successful effort to complete the transformation or the NLRB into a pro-employer agency" (154). 
Many NLRB polic ies and precedents were reversed. 
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Conclusion 
Labor relations typically have a cumulative pattern. Accommodation 
leads to more accommodation, hostility to more hostility, until some fun-
damental change occurs (like that of the Great Depression). Employers 
and labor always have some interests in common. Intervention by a third 
party in favor of either side easily increases bitterness and stubbornness 
and may thus breed more intervention. The cumulative aspect makes it 
urgent to analyze closely the early period of collective labor relations . 
Behavior is shaped not only by relatively stable social nmms but also by 
events, as can be seen in the shift in Swedish employers' attitude and 
strategy 1905-1906. 
Structural change in American industry, shifts in employer strategies, 
and trends within the union movement itself have caused a decline in 
unionism since the 1960s. New legal restrictions during the same period 
have added much to the difficulties of the unions. The legacy of more 
than a hundred years of struggles about the rights of labor carries an over-
whelming weight. American labor relations of today are not the products 
of a free interplay between employers and workers. The government 
encouraged employers to resist the unions' demand for recognition, and 
the unions were molded by the legal system, lured into blind alleys, and 
forced to make Catch 22-choices, while Swedish collective laissez-faire 
promoted stability and order in the labor market. 
In Sweden government non-intervention, a near-absence of legislation 
about labor relations , and key decisions in the Supreme Court facilitated 
a rapid growth of the unions and, indirectly, of the Social Democratic 
Party. Conditions in pre-democratic Sweden that counteracted govern-
ment intervention in employer-labor relations and promoted workers ' 
freedom to organize made Sweden go further to the left than other Euro-
pean countries. To understand why America went to the right we must 
take into account the constitutional position of the courts , judicial review, 
the common law doctrines of criminal conspiracy and injunctions, and 
the anti -labor stance of the judiciary, in line with Madison 's warning 
against a faction representing the property less masses. Legal restraints 
were particularly effective against attempts to organize unskilled 
workers. Labor organizations became more conservative than in other 
countries and smaller and less influential than they had a potential to be . 
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Labor in America is a suppressed alternative. Low levels of union mem-
bership affected workers' participation in politics and elections, and -
indirectly - public policy. 
